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Mulcahy: Proving Causation in Toxic Torts Litigation

NOTES

PROVING CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORTS
LITIGATION
INTRODUCTION

During the past thirty to forty years, the production and use of
chemicals have become a major part of American industries., Such
industries generate hazardous waste 2 as a by-product of manufacturing goods such as medicines, textiles, petroleum products, leather,
and paints. The Environmental Protection Agency has estimated
that more than 54 million metric tons of hazardous waste are generated each year in the United States.3 Approximately ninety percent
of this waste is handled improperly from the time it is generated 4
with the result that many toxic substances have negatively affected
the lives and health of unknowing victims. 5 In fact, the problem of
hazardous waste disposal has been described as "a public health
nightmare of extraordinary dimensions."'
Millions of Americans are unaware that they are encountering
potentially serious health risks everyday.7 Most victims never con1. See 10 N.Y. ST. ENV'T, Jan. 19, 1981, at 3.
2. Note, Hazardous Waste: Third-Party Compensationfor Contingencies Arising from
Inactive and Abandoned Hazardous Waste DisposalSites, 33 S.C.L. REV. 543, 543 (1982).
3. 47 Fed. Reg. 1834 (1982). New York State industries generate 1.36 million tons of
hazardous waste annually. 10 N.Y. ST. ENV'T, Jan. 19, 1981, at 3.
4. 47 Fed. Reg. 1834 (1982).
5. For example, in 1954, Hooker Chemicals and Plastics Corporation started to dispose
hazardous waste into unlined pits in Montague, Michigan. The toxic substances migrated into
the wells used by residents for drinking water. SENATE COMM. ON ENV'T AND PUBLIC WORKS,
96th Cong., 2d Sess., REPORT ON SIx CASE STUDIES OF COMPENSATION FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES POLLUTION: ALABAMA, CALIFORNIA, MICHIGAN, MISSOURI, NEW JERSEY AND TEXAS

212-15 (Comm. Print 1980). Hazardous waste dumped in a New Jersey landfill and on a
former chicken farm in 1971 contaminated the drinking water of nearby residents. Id. at 33940.
6. Health Effects of Hazardous Waste Disposal Practices,1980: Joint HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Health and Scientific Research of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human
Resources and the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980) (statement
of Senator Edward Kennedy) [hereinafter cited as Health Effects].
7. Id. at 2.
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sciously choose to face the risks of exposure to hazardous waste.8
They select their living environment unaware of the danger that may
lurk underground. Because many hazardous waste disposal sites still
have not been discovered," there is a "chemical time bomb ticking
beneath the earth" which could explode at any time 10 causing devastation to innocent people.
The notorious incident at Love Canal brought the disastrous effects of improper toxic waste disposal to the forefront of public attention." The residents of the Love Canal homesites became innocent victims of the hazardous waste buried beneath their homes.
They developed afflictions such as cancer, leukemia, liver tumors,
and nervous system disorders, resulting in serious debilitation or
death. Many pregnant women suffered miscarriages or bore children
12
with birth defects.
Victims of toxic torts are usually unaware of their exposure to
toxic substances. The substances often are invisible, tasteless, and
odorless; they are transported through the air or by percolating surface or ground waters. 3 The latency period between exposure and
discovery of the injury is usually long.14 Detection and causation
problems are complicated because manifestations of toxic substance
contamination may vary with each victim and many illnesses or injuries, including cancers or miscarriages, have other possible causes.
Furthermore, the harm-causing substance may be a combination of
benign substances that were discharged by a number of industries. 5
The characteristics of toxic substances create a number of ob8. Ginsberg & Weiss, Common Law Liabilityfor Toxic Torts: A Phantom Remedy, 9
HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 906 (1981).

9. Health Effects, supra note 6, at 2.
10.

Id.

1I. Love Canal takes its name from William T. Love who dug the canal in the 1890's.
When the project was abandoned the partially dug canal was used as a landfill. Hooker Chemical and Plastics Corporation deposited 21,800 tons of chemical wastes from its plants in the
canal between 1942 and 1953. When the canal reached its capacity, Hooker covered it up and
conveyed the property to the City of Niagara Falls Board of Education in April 1953. An
elementary school was built on that site and houses were built on the land surrounding the

school. In the mid-1970s the first signs that the landfill was leaking were noticed and reported
to local officials. In 1978, the hazards of the leachate were realized and people began to evacuate the area. N.Y. ST. DEP'T OF HEALTH, LOVE CANAL: A SPECIAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND LEGISLATURE 4-8 (Apr. 1981).
12. Id. at 21-23.
13. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 8, at 921.

14. See id. (illness may not occur until quantities of contaminants have been ingested
over time).
15.

Id. at 923.
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stacles that a toxic tort victim must surmount to obtain a judicial
remedy. Among these are the statute of limitations,16 the expense
and difficulties involved in accumulating data, 17 and proof of causation.' The causation problem is two-fold: First, the victim must determine the substance that caused the injury'9 and second, the party
responsible for discharging that substance must be identified.20 This
note addresses the latter aspect of the causation issue relating to
identification of the responsible party and examines how courts have
dealt with this issue in toxic tort cases.
The burden of identifying the responsible party can be an impossible one to meet. The Love Canal situation is atypical because it
was known that Hooker Electro Chemical Company generated and
transported the hazardous waste to the canal.2 ' Furthermore, the canal was owned and operated as a disposal site by Hooker. Therefore,
the management of the site and the bulk of the wastes buried there
can be attributed to one party. 2
The typical hazardous waste disposal site involves many participants, who have been categorized as generators, transporters, and
disposal site operators.23 To complicate the identification issue further, the substances disposed of in a site may have come from several
different generators and the site may have had more than one owner. 24 Generators often use the services of more than one transporter,
and transporters typically carry the wastes of several generators to
any number of disposal sites. 25 Records by generators, transporters
and site owners are rarely kept.26 Consequently, the plaintiffs,
through no fault of their own, may not be able "to isolate a culpable
16. Id. at 920-21.
17. Id. at 924-25.
18. Id. at 922-24.
19. Id. at 922-23. Ascertaining the substance that caused the injury is very difficult and
often impossible for a number of reasons. First, substances that escaped into the air or water
may have combined with other substances forming a new compound. Id. Second, a substance
may manifest itself in different ways depending upon the characteristics of the individual it
contaminates. Id. Third, the latency period between exposure and injury may also vary with
each individual. Id.
20. Soble, A Proposalfor the Administrative Compensation of Victims of Toxic Substance Pollution"A Model Act, 14 HARV. J. ON LEGis. 683, 706 (1977).
21. Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 8, at 896.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 896-97.
25. Id. at 897.
26. See id. at 891 n.131.
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party in the waste disposal chain."2
Similarly, without proof of the precise cause of the injury, the
plaintiff may not be able to meet the two traditional tests of causation: the "but for" and the "substantial factor" tests.2" Under the
"but for" test, the defendant's conduct is not deemed to be the cause
of the plaintiff's injury if the injury would have occurred in the absence of such action. 29 A person exposed to a toxic substance that
escaped from a hazardous waste landfill will encounter difficulties
proving that his injury would not have occurred "but for" the defendant's conduct, particularly where the injury sustained has more
than one possible medical cause.3 0
The "substantial factor" test of causation would require the
plaintiff to prove that the defendant's conduct was a "substantial
factor" in bringing about the plaintiff's harm. 31 In general, the characteristics of toxic substances 32 are such that victims often face considerable difficulty in proving that a particular defendant's conduct
was a substantial factor in causing their harm. Thus, although this
test may be less burdensome than the "but for" test, as a practical
matter, it is also generally inappropriate3 3 if the plaintiff is to be
given any opportunity to recover.
Courts have alleviated the victims' burden of proving this aspect
of causation in other toxic tort areas, such as asbestos-related diseases 34 and DES injuries. 35 This note examines the approaches taken
by the courts in these areas and analyzes the applicability of these
judicial approaches to hazardous waste victims.
CAUSATION THEORIES IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION

Background
Although the mineral asbestos 36 has been known and utilized
27. Id. at 897.
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 239 (4th ed. 1971).
29. Id.
30. See Ginsberg & Weiss, supra note 8, at 922-23.
31. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, at 240.
32. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 75-84.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 36-130.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 147-217.
36. Asbestos is a mineral that can be separated into long, flexible fibers. Comment, Asbestos Litigation: The Dust Has Yet to Settle, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 55, 57 (1978). The
properties of asbestos satisfy many of the industrial needs of society. It can be spun and woven,
it is resistant to heat and chemicals, and it is extremely durable. 4A R. GRAY, ATrORNEYS'
TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 11 205C.03, 205C.10 (3d ed. 1981). Asbestos is used as an insulator
28.
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for centuries, its use did not become commonplace until the end of
the nineteenth century.37 During World War II, the use of asbestos
became extremely widespread. Nearly thirty-two million tons of asbestos had been used in the United States by 1978, with the bulk of
it used after 1940.38 During that period, a number of diseases became linked with the inhalation of asbestos dust. The first asbestosrelated disease to be discovered was asbestosis, 39 defined as pulmonary fibrosis,40 which produces "fibrotic changes . . . in the lung

substance itself and in the pleura, the lining of the chest cavity that
also surrounds the lung tissue. ' 41 It is an incurable disease whose
characteristics include scarring of the lung tissue, chronic coughing
and shortness of breath. As the disease progresses, the victim may
have difficulty breathing during exertion or even at rest.42 Asbestosis
is the cumulative result of long-term exposure to asbestos.43
In the early 1970's, mesothelioma also became associated with
asbestos inhalation. 4 Mesothelioma produces a malignant tumor in
the lining of the chest, thorax, or abdomen.45 Unlike asbestosis, the
development of mesothelioma is not cumulative; one exposure to asbestos dust could result in the growth of the tumor.40 The disease
usually does not manifest itself until thirty to thirty-five years after
exposure.
Victims of asbestos-related diseases who seek judicial remedies
must prove legal causation (that the asbestos that caused the disease
originated with the defendant), 48 and medical causation (that the afof electrical and thermal materials, as a structural reinforcer for substances such as cement
and asphalt, and as a packaging material. Id.
37. 4A R. GRAY,supra note 36, %205C.10.
38. Mehaffy, Asbestos-Related Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 342 (1980).
39. Id. at 342-43. Other diseases that have been related to exposure to asbestos are lung
cancer, gastro-intestinal cancer, cancer of the larynx and cancer of the kidneys. R. GRAY,
supra note 36, 11 205C.73-74. "However,. . . medical research ... has not progressed to the
point where any meaningful conclusion can be drawn" that would positively connect these
diseases with asbestos. Mehaffy, supra note 38, at 345.
40. Mehaffy, supra note 38, at 343.
41. R. GRAY, supra note 36, 1 205C.00.
42. Id. %205C.30.
43. See id. T 205C.40.
44. Mehaffy, supra note 38, at 344.
45. R. GRAY,supra note 36, 1 205C.72.
46. N. Y. ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, CANCER AND THE WORKER 50 (1977), cited with
approval in, Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1353, 1355 (E.D. Tex. 1981),
rev'd on other grounds, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982).
47. R. GRAY, supra note 36, 1 205C.72.
48. See, e.g., lb A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW § 41.64(C) (1981).
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fliction, in fact, was caused by asbestos). 49 The burden of proving
legal causation is a heavy one since it is difficult, if not impossible, to
ascertain who exposed the plaintiff to the particular asbestos that
caused his disease. Courts faced with asbestos litigation have taken
various approaches towards this causation issue in an effort to lessen
the plaintiffs' burden of proof.50 Medical causation is easily proved
in cases of asbestosis and mesothelioma since the inhalation of asbestos dust is the only cause of these ailments. 51 This is not the case,
however, for a victim of lung cancer. While lung cancer can be contracted from breathing asbestos dust, studies have shown that cigarette smoking and asbestos dust have a synergistic effect.5 2 An asbestos worker who smokes has a much greater chance of contracting
lung cancer than would a non-smoker, or a smoker who is not exposed to the mineral.5" An asbestos worker who smokes cigarettes,
therefore, would find it more difficult to prove that his lung cancer is
medically caused by asbestos than would a non-smoking victim of
asbestosis or mesothelioma.
In cases where factors in addition to asbestos exposure affected
the victim's health, some courts have held the asbestos to be a cause
of the disability if the absestos contributed to or accelerated the disability. 54 In Self v. Starr-Davis Co.,55 the decedent had been employed by the defendant for twenty-two years, during which time he
was continually exposed to asbestos dust. Upon learning that he had
contracted asbestosis, the decedent immediately left his job with the
defendant; subsequently, he died of a brain tumor.56 The decedent's
wife filed a claim for workers' compensation death benefits and was
ultimately awarded compensation. The hearing commissioner found
that, although the primary cause of death was a brain tumor, which
was not causally related to the asbestosis, the asbestosis had accelerated and contributed to the decedent's death.57
The state court of appeals affirmed the finding of the commis49. See, e.g., Id.
50. See infra notes 54-130 and accompanying text.
51. See Mehaffy, supra note 38, at 343-44.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Crump v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 367 So. 2d 300 (La. 1979)
(holding that the plaintiff's age and weight did not negate asbestos causation of disability);
Self v. Starr-Davis Co., 13 N.C. App. 694, 187 S.E.2d 466 (1972)(holding that asbestos contributed to the plaintiff's death despite his malignant tumor).
55. 13 N.C. App. 694, 187 S.E.2d 466 (1972).
56. Id. at 696, 187 S.E.2d at 468.
57. Id. at 696, 187 S.E.2d at 467.
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sioner, stating that, although it was true that "asbestosis did not aggravate the tumor and had no relation whatsoever to the tumor," the
asbestosis accelerated and contributed to the death of the decedent.",
In Crump v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,59 the Supreme Court of Louisiana also determined that the claimant was entitled to workers' compensation benefits. Crump, who contracted asbestosis, had worked for the National Gypsum Company for twentyeight years. 60 He sued for benefits, naming National Gypsum and its
compensation insurer as defendants. 61 At trial, conflicting medical
evidence was presented as to the cause of the plaintiff's disability.
The three physicians who examined Crump agreed that he was totally disabled, but only one concluded that asbestosis was the sole
cause.62 The others testified that Crump's age and excessive weight
were the primary causes of his disability. The trial court applied the
"substantial factor" test of causation and determined that while the
claimant's age and weight contributed to his inability to work, the
63
asbestosis was "a substantial contributory cause" to his disability.
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
64
upheld the trial court's judgment that the defendants were liable.
The more difficult questions of proof lie in the area of legal causation. Under traditional theories of legal causation, a person who
has been exposed to asbestos in more than one place would have difficulty proving which of the exposures caused his disease.6 5 In
Yocom v. Gentry,66 however, the Supreme Court of Kentucky alleviated the plaintiff's evidentiary burden of proving which exposure
caused his injury. Gentry had worked with asbestos and fiberglass at
Ebonite Company for three and one half years. After he developed
asbestosis and became disabled, Gentry filed a claim against Ebonite
for workers' compensation benefits. 67 Ebonite contended that since
"there is slight exposure to asbestos particles by the general public,"
the asbestos that caused Gentry's disease may not have come from
58. Id. at 699, 187 S.E.2d at 470.
59. 367 So. 2d 300 (La. 1979).
60. Id. at 302.
61. Id. at 301.
62. Id. at 303-04.
63. Id. at 303.
64. Id. at 304.
65. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1083 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
66. 535 S.W.2d 850 (Ky. 1976).
67. Id. at 851.
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Ebonite.68 The court rejected this argument and held Ebonite liable
because Gentry's "only significant exposure . . . to the hazards of
the disease was with Ebonite."6 9 The Yocom court had to determine,
therefore, whether Gentry's disease was incident to his employment
at Ebonite or the result of general exposure to asbestos.
The dilemma faced by the Yocun court is complicated greatly
in situations where the victim was exposed to asbestos dust at more
than one work place. In such cases, there is virtually no way to determine where the victim inhaled the asbestos that caused his
harm.7 0 Fortunately, not all asbestos victims are left remediless simply because they cannot prove whose product caused their disease. A
number of approaches have been used by the courts to lessen the
victims' causation burden and to impose liability on the defendants.
Courts have applied the "substantial factor" test,7 1 the market share
liability theory,7 2 the last injurious exposure rule, 3 and the duration
74
and intensity approach.
"SubstantialFactor" Test
The "substantial factor" test was applied by the court in Borel
v. FibreboardPaper Products Corp.75 Borel was the first asbestosis
claim to be tried to a final verdict. 76 Clarence Borel was employed as
an industrial insulation worker from 1936 until 1969 when he became disabled from asbestosis.7 7 Because he was unable to determine
which asbestos exposure had caused his disease,78 he brought suit
against eleven manufacturers of asbestos insulation materials whose
products he had been in contact with throughout his career.7 9
Since each exposure to asbestos contributes to the harm and
causes more tissue damage, the victim's condition is the result of
past and recent exposures.80 Additionally, although the latency period usually varies from ten to twenty-five years, the disease has
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 852.
Id.
See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d at 1083.
See infra text accompanying notes 75-84.
See Infra text accompanying notes 85-99.
See infra text accompanying notes 100-21.
See Infra text accompanying notes 122-30.
493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
Mehaffy, supra note 38, at 345.
493 F.2d at 1081-82.
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1086.
Id. at 1083.
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been known to manifest itself less than ten or more than twenty-five
years after the initial exposure.81 The combination of these factors
made it practically impossible to ascertain which exposure or exposures actually caused the plaintiff's injury. 2
Recognizing that legal causation could not be proved to an absolute certainty, the Borel court applied the "substantial factor" test
of causation: "[A] defendant's conduct is the cause of the event if it
was a substantial factor in bringing it about. 83 Since Borel contracted asbestosis from inhaling asbestos dust to which he was exposed by each of the defendants on numerous occasions, and because
the cumulative effect of exposure was undisputed, the court found
enough circumstantial evidence to hold each defendant liable as a
substantial factor in bringing about Borel's harm.8
Market Share Liability
The Borel decision brought to the courts a barrage of asbestosrelated cases.8 5 Fifty-seven of these cases were consolidated for determination of pretrial motions and were captioned Hardy v. JohnsManville Sales Corp.88 Faced with the task of ruling on the consolidated discovery motion seeking information relating to the defendants' share of the asbestos market, a federal court in Texas had to
determine whether the market share liability theory" was applicable
to asbestos-related litigation.88 The market share liability concept allows plaintiffs to recover damages notwithstanding the fact that they
cannot identify a particular defendant whose product caused the
harm. 9 The plaintiff initially must come forward with proof of exposure to the product and proof of medical causation, i.e., that the
product caused the injury. If the plaintiff satisfies this requirement,
81.

Id.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 1094 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF TORTS
(4th ed. 1971)).

§

41, at 240

84. Id.
85.

Mehaffy, supra note 38, at 345.

86. 509 F. Supp. 1353 (E.D. Tex. 1981), rev'd, 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982). The
reversal by the Fifth Circuit did not affect the district court's analysis of market share liability
as that issue was not raised on appeal. 681 F.2d at 336. Rather, the Fifth Circuit's opinion

primarily addressed the applicability of collateral estoppel in "mass tort" cases. Id.
87. The market share liability theory was expounded in Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal.
3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). See infra text
accompanying notes 164-77.
88. 509 F. Supp. at 1356.
89. Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to the DES Causation Problem, 94
HARV. L. REV. 668, 677 (1981).
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the burden then shifts to the defendants to demonstrate that their
product(s) could not have caused the plaintiff's harmY0 The defendants who cannot meet this burden are held individually liable for a
portion of the judgment equal to their proportionate share of the
market."'
Because the cumulative nature of asbestosis and the long, indefinite latency period for asbestosis and mesothelioma may hamper a
victim's ability to pinpoint the exact causative agent of the disease,
the market share theory of liability appeared to the Hardy court to
be a logical way of dealing with the causation issue.92 Furthermore,
the Hardy court noted that the California court, 93 which had created
the market share theory, relied upon the alternative and concurrent
liability theory9 4 set forth in Summers v. Tice,95 and that Summers
had a precedential equivalent in Texas.9 For these reasons, the federal court in Hardy felt safe in assuming that a Texas state court
faced with an asbestos-related claim would apply the market share
liability theory and, thereby, relieve the plaintiff of the burden of
proving causation. 97 As a result, the court granted the discovery motion related to this theory. 98 Although the market share liability approach appears to be an equitable solution in the context of asbestos
injury litigation, its acceptance has been limited as exemplified by its
codification in the workers' compensation law of only one state.99
Last Injurious Exposure
The "last injurious exposure" rule is followed by the majority of
jurisdictions faced with occupational disease cases, in workers' compensation contexts, where the exact cause of the disease is uncertain.100 In Mathis v. State Accident Insurance Fund,'0 ' Mathis had
90. Id. at 672.
91. 509 F. Supp. at 1358 (citing Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924,
163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980)).
92. Id.
93. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
94. 509 F. Supp. at 1359.
95. See 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948).
96. 509 F. Supp. at 1359.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. CAL. LAD. CODE § 5500.5(e) (West Supp. 1982).
100. See, e.g., Ringeisen v. Insulation Servs. Inc., 539 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976)
(the plaintiff was unable to recover, however, because neither employer qualified as a "last
employer"); Mathis v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 10 Or. App. 139, 499 P.2d 1331 (1972)
(holding that conditions of the plaintiff's last employer were such as to have possibly .aused

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol11/iss4/7

10

Mulcahy: Proving Causation in Toxic Torts Litigation
1983]

CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORTS

worked with asbestos for several employers for more than thirty
years. He left his last position with Metalclad Insulation only four
months after learning that he had contracted asbestosis. °2 His claim
against Metalclad and its insurance company for workers' compensation was denied because he failed to establish a causal link between
his last employer and his disability.10 3 On appeal, the Oregon Court
of Appeals adopted the "last injurious exposure" rule. This rule imposes full liability on a defendant/employer where the plaintiff was
last exposed to the hazardous material during his employment with
that defendant and the hazardous condition bears a causal relation
to the disability.104 Legal causation need not be proved-the last employer will be liable as long as there is "sufficient evidence to support
the general rule requirement that the conditions of the last employment were such that they could cause asbestosis over some indefinite
period of time." 10 5 To illustrate: Suppose V was first employed by A
for thirty years and then by B for twenty-five days. At both places V
worked in an asbestos-filled environment. He discontinued his employment with B when he discovered that he had contracted asbestosis. According to the "last injurious expqsure" rule, only B will be
liable for V's harm if the conditions where V was employed by B
could have caused asbestosis over that period of time.106
Mathis demonstrates that the general rule may present inequities to short-term employers. The Oregon Legislature, however, has
given employers a means to protect themselves by allowing employers to require potential employees to submit to a medical examination.10 7 In this way, employers can avoid hiring workers who are suffering from advanced occupational diseases.10 8
Other state legislatures have modified the "last injurious exposure" rule in a different manner to guard against the aforementioned
asbestosis); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Luker, 511 S.W.2d 587 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)
(holding that there was sufficient evidence that the plaintiff's last place of employment could

have caused asbestosis).
101. 10 Or. App. 139, 499 P.2d 1331 (1972).
102. Id. at 142, 499 P.2d at 1332.
103. Id. at 141, 499 P.2d at 1332.
104. Id. at 145, 499 P.2d at 1334. The "last injurious exposure" rule has been codified
in a number of jurisdictions. E.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1314(6) (1976); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 19, § 2329 (1979); N.Y. WORK. Comp. LAW § 44 (McKinney 1965); OR. REV. STAT. §
656.807 (1981).
105. 10 Or. App. at 150, 499 P.2d at 1336.

106. Id. at 149-50, 499 P.2d at 1335-36.
107. OR. REV. STAT. § 656.806 (1981).
108.

10 Or. App. at 150 n.4, 499 P.2d at 1336 n.4.
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problem. These states have set forth minimum periods of employment before the employer can be held liable. 10 9 To recover, the
plaintiff only must identify the last employer who exposed him to
asbestos for more than the statutory period of time. In addition, the
plaintiff must prove that he inhaled asbestos dust at that place of
employment, that asbestos dust is the cause of his disease, and that
he is disabled.11 0 This statutory scheme effectively removes the plaintiff's burden of proving legal causation.1 '
The Missouri Court of Appeals, in Ringeisen v. Insulation Serthe "last injurious exposure" rule to a
vices, Inc., 12 has analogized
"rule of convenience." 113 The adoption of this rule in Missouri was
precipitated by the finding that "any search for positive proof of causation among several employers in cases of occupational diseases was
a futile search. 1 1 4 In this jurisdiction the victim's last employer will
be liable as long as the victim was exposed to the hazardous substance at that last place of employment."1 5 The last employer cannot
be held liable, however, if the victim worked there for less than
ninety days. 1 6
While Mathis pointed out how inequitable the "last injurious
exposure" rule can be to a short-term employer,"' Ringeisen expressed its discontentment with the potential effects of the ninety
day time constraint on injured workers who have not worked in any
one place for that length of time.' 18 It was undisputed that the plaintiff in Ringeisen had contracted asbestosis and that he had been exposed to asbestos dust both at Owens Corning Fiber Glass Corporation and at Insulation Services, Inc. 119 Since he was not employed at
either place for more than ninety days, however, the court could not
1 20
compensate him because of the "clear meaning of the statute.
The court suggested that the legislature should give this dilemma
109. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 72-439 (1973) (60 days); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, §
172.36 (Supp. 1982) (60 days); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-3-7-33 (West 1981) (60 days); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 1401(g) (Purdon Supp. 1982) (6 months).
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

See generally 4 A. LARSON, supra note 48, § 95.21.
See supra text accompanying notes 48-50.
539 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976).
Id. at 624.
Id.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.063(1) (Supp. 1982).
Id. § 287.063(2).
See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
539 S.W.2d at 625.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 625.
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further consideration.121
Duration and Intensity
Another approach to the causation problem was applied in Caudie-Hyatt, Inc. v. Mixon, 2 2 by the Virginia Supreme Court. The
suit originated as a workers' compensation claim by Henry Mixon,
and was pursued by his wife after he died of mesothelioma 123 Mrs.
Mixon was awarded death benefits and Caudle-Hyatt appealed to
the Virginia Supreme Court. 24 One of the issues raised on appeal
was the claimant's failure to prove causation. The defendants contended that although Mixon had been exposed to asbestos during his
employment at Caudle-Hyatt, the exposure did not "cause, augment,
or aggravate the disease.11 25 For a Virginia employer to be liable,
the Virginia workers' compensation statute requires that the employee have had "an exposure to the causative hazard of such disease
which is reasonably calculated to bring on the disease in question." 1 28 The Caudle-Hyatt court, holding in favor of Mixon, stated
that actual causation need not be proved; the plaintiff need only
show that the "aggravation of the disease or . . . the exposure was
of such duration and intensity that it generally causes the disease in
question, even though actual causation or aggravation cannot be established in the claimant's case. 1 2 7
The Caudle-Hyatt case demonstrates that a plaintiff afflicted
with an asbestos-related ailment need not be denied relief simply because proof of actual causation is difficult or impossible to obtain.
The plaintiff need only prove that his exposure was of a certain duration and intensity. 128 In this case, a medical expert testified that exposure to asbestos for one month could produce mesothelioma. In
addition, Mixon's co-workers testified that Mixon worked for at least
one month in an environment where asbestos dust and insulation
remnants existed . 29 The court held that the evidence supported the
conclusion that Mixon was "'injuriously exposed'" to asbestos in
that it was "'reasonably calculated to bring on the disease in
121. Id.
122. 220 Va. 495, 260 S.E.2d 193 (1979).
123. Id. at 497, 260 S.E.2d at 194.

124. Id.
125.

Id. at 499, 260 S.E.2d at 195.

126. VA. CODE § 65.1-52 (Supp. 1982).
127.
128.
129.

220 Va. at 500, 260 S.E.2d at 196.
Id.
Id.
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"130

These cases demonstrate that although people afflicted with asbestos-related diseases cannot prove with certainty which exposure to
asbestos caused their disease, they are not always left without a remedy. The approaches to this problem vary in these jurisdictions, but
the end result is the same: liability may be found even though legal
causation is never proved.
APPLICATION OF ASBESTOS CAUSATION THEORIES TO
ARISING FROM HAZARDOUS WASTE

Toxic TORTS

Victims of hazardous waste injuries often face comparable difficulties in proving the cause of their afflictions. First, the hazardous
waste victim cannot always isolate the harm-causing substance. 131
Second, once the substance is identified, it is often problematic for
the victim to trace it to its specific source.132
The first difficulty is analogous to that of the asbestos worker
who contracted asbestosis but died from a brain tumor, 33 or the asbestos worker whose age and excessive weight contributed to his disability.1 34 The courts allowed these plaintiffs to recover where asbes5
tos accelerated or contributed to the victim's death or disability.13
Similarly, the judiciary could reach a comparable result by applying
these modified causation theories (derived from asbestos litigation)
to those hazardous waste cases where the victim cannot isolate the
injurious substance.
The lenient approach of the Caudle-Hyatt court, where the
plaintiff only had to prove that the duration and intensity of his exposure generally caused the injury he sustained, 136 is an easier burden for a victim of an asbestos-related disease to meet than for a
hazardous waste victim. Asbestos has been widely used since the end
of the nineteenth century and its properties are well-known. It was
first linked to various diseases in the middle part of this century and
an abundance of information has accumulated regarding the nature
and characteristics of the diseases. 37 In contrast, toxic torts from
130. Id.
131. See Soble, supra note 20, at 706-07. See also supra text accompanying notes 1315.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Soble, supra note 20, at 706-07. See also supra text accompanying notes 28-33.
See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-64.
See supra text accompanying notes 54-64.
220 Va. at 500, 260 S.E.2d at 196.
See supra text accompanying notes 36-47.
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leaching hazardous waste were first brought to the forefront of public attention in the 1970's with the incident at Love Canal.1 3s Little
is known about the injuries that may result from the chemicals that
have been disposed of in landfills.139 Therefore, due to this relative
disparity in knowledge, hazardous waste victims would have a
greater burden to prove duration and intensity of exposure than the
asbestos-related victims. If the hazardous waste victim can identify
the substance that caused the harm, proving duration and intensity
of exposure to that substance would be less burdensome. The victim
would still have the difficult task of proving who disposed of the specific harm-producing chemical.
Lessening the plaintiff's burden may appear to be unjust to the
defendant since the producer of a toxic substance may then be held
liable for injuries suffered by the plaintiff despite the lack of direct
proof that the defendant caused the harm. Moreover, the defendant
may not be in a better position than the plaintiff to prove that the
plaintiff's harm originated from another source. While this may
seem to push the tort system past its limits, 140 the plaintiff should
not be denied compensation merely because other factors contributed
to his injury as long as it still can be proved that the hazardous
substance disposed of by the defendant may have contributed to or
accelerated the harm. The defendant who exposes the plaintiff to the
risk of harm by discharging the toxic substance should not escape
liability simply because other factors also contributed to the plaintiff's injuries.
In the second situation where the victim can identify the substance that caused the injury and can trace it to a number of possible sources, the courts could apply the theories used in the asbestos
cases so that innocent victims can be compensated without proof of
the precise causal source. This would be analogous to the asbestos
worker in Borel who was exposed to the asbestos products of a number of manufacturers and could not determine which exposure was
the actual cause.1 41 That court applied the "substantial factor" test
of causation and allowed the plaintiff to recover without proving specifically which manufacturer's asbestos caused his disease.1 42 The cu138. See supra note 11.
139.

See Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs, 67 A.B.A. J. 139, 139 (1981).

140. See id. at 141.
141. Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
142.

Id. at 1094. See supra text accompanying notes 75-84.
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mulative nature of asbestosis made the substantial factor test applicable since each asbestos product could conceivably have contributed
to his injury.143 The reasoning of the Borel court could be applied to
a hazardous waste case if the plaintiff can establish that his injury
resulted from the cumulative exposure to the defendant's toxicant.
To do so, however, the plaintiff must ascertain information as to the
nature and characteristics of that substance. Since toxic torts resulting from hazardous waste disposal are relatively new14 in comparison with asbestos-related diseases, such information would probably
not be available to the plaintiff. Therefore, the "substantial factor"
test of causation, as applied in Borel, may not be useful to hazardous
waste victims.
The court could apply the "last injurious exposure" rule when
the plaintiff can identify the last defendant to discharge the hazardous substance causally related to the victim's injury. Although the
inequities of this rule were observed in the asbestos cases, 46 it nevertheless was adopted in a number of jurisdictions.146 This rule would
allow the hazardous waste victim to recover without proving causation if he can identify the harm-causing substance and the last
source of his exposure. Unless accurate records were kept by the defendants as to the quantity and time of discharges, the plaintiff
would face the impossible task of proving who was the last to discharge the substance. Furthermore, where the "last injurious exposure" rule was applied to asbestos cases, the different exposures to
asbestos were distinct events. This is generally not the case in the
hazardous waste area, since the plaintiff is not moving from one
place of exposure to another. In situations where multiple defendants
disposed of hazardous substances in the same landfill, the issue of
whoever dumped last would be irrelevant if the substances leached
out several years after the last discharge occurred. The victim would
be exposed to each defendant's toxicant at the same time. Therefore,
the "last injurious exposure" rule, if used at all in the hazardous
143. See supra text accompanying note 80. Two defendant companies contended that
they should be absolved from liability because Borel's exposure to their asbestos products was
recent and thus outside the 10 to 15 years latency period for asbestosis. The court noted that
"even the most recent exposures could have added to or accelerated Borel's overall condition."
493 F.2d at 1094.
144. See Podgers, supra note 139, at 139.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 106, 118.
146. See, e.g., statutes cited supra note 104. See also Ringeisen v. Insulation Servs. Inc.,
539 S.W.2d 621 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Mathis v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 10 Or. App. 139,
499 P.2d 1331 (1972).
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waste area, would have very limited applications.
While the solutions to the causation problem in the asbestos
cases could have an impact on hazardous waste cases, it is apparent
that some modifications would be necessary to accomodate the special needs of hazardous waste plaintiffs. The approaches some courts
have taken in the DES area may be of assistance to these victims.
CAUSATION THEORIES IN

DES CASES

Background
DES refers to a group of synthetic estrogens 147 which were prescribed to pregnant women from the late 1940's until 1971 for a
variety of reasons, including the prevention of miscarriages. 148 The
drug, which was developed in England in 1938, was not patented by
its inventor149 and, therefore, anyone could market it. In 1947, when
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved the use of DES
for the prevention of certain complications during pregnancy,150 hundreds of pharmaceutical companies in the United States became involved in marketing the drug in subsequent years. 151
In 1971, the FDA indicated that DES was both ineffective and
dangerous for use by pregnant women. 52 Studies revealed a link between the use of DES during pregnancies and a form of gynecological cancer in daughters born from those pregnancies.15 3 By the time
the FDA banned the use of DES during pregnancies, millions of
women had consumed the drug while pregnant and many of their
female offspring had been confronted with the possibility of developing vaginal and cervical cancer.'"
Approximately one thousand lawsuits have been commenced
against DES manufacturers 5 5 based on a products liability cause of
action. 156 One commentator noted that plaintiffs are able to prove
147.
See 7 AM.
148.
149.
REV. 963,

DES is the common abbreviation for diethylstilbestrol, dienestrol, and stilbestrol.
J. L. & MED. 213 (1981).
Note, supra note 89, at 668.
Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
976 (1978).

FORDHAM

L.

150. Id. at 963.
151. Id. at 964.
152. Certain Estrogens for Oral and Parenteral Use, 36 Fed. Reg. 21,537-38 (1971).
DES is safe for use by non-pregnant women and is still prescribed for other purposes. Comment, supra note 149, at 963 n.2.
153. Comment, supra note 149, at 964.
154. Note, supra note 89, at 668.

155. Id. at 669.
156. Generally, to recover for injuries under a products liability theory, the plaintiff
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that DES caused their injuries, that the defendant drug companies
manufactured DES for the prevention of miscarriages, that the defendants knew or should have known that DES was carcinogenic,
and that the defendants failed to warn the plaintiffs' mothers of the
hazards of the drug. 157 The plaintiffs, however, still have the burden
of identifying which drug company manufactured the DES that their
mothers ingested.1 58 Establishing this causal link is extremely difficult, and perhaps, impossible, since the various brands of the unpatented and fungible DES pills were essentially interchangeable. 59 As
a result, physicians often prescribed it without specifying a particular brand aid pharmacists often dispensed it with whatever brand
they happened to have had in stock at the time.16 0 Records of which
brand filled a particular prescription are usually unavailable. 16
A number of plaintiffs have been precluded from recovering
damages for their injuries because they failed to identify the specific
drug company that manufactured the DES that caused their injury. 162 Other courts, cognizant of the difficulties in applying traditional causation theories to DES cases, have allowed plaintiffs to reconnection
cover notwithstanding their inability to prove a causal
63
between their injury and a particular manufacturer.
Market Share Liability
64
the daughters of women
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,1
who had ingested DES while pregnant brought a class action suit
against eleven pharmaceutical companies that produced DES. The
plaintiffs claimed that their cancerous or precancerous conditions re-

must prove (1) that she was injured by the product, (2) that the injury occurred because the
product was defective, unreasonably unsafe, and (3) that the defective product came from the
defendant. W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 103, at 671-72.
157. Note, supra note 89, at 669.
158. Id. at 669-70.
159.

Comment, Diethylstilbestrol.Extension of FederalClass Action Proceduresto Ge-

neric Drug Litigation, 14 U.S.F.L. REv. 461, 466 (1980).
160. Id. at 466.
161.

Id.

162. See, e.g., Gray v. United States, 445 F. Supp. 337 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Namm v.
Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981).

163. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 94 Mich. App. 59, 289
N.W.2d 20 (1980); Ferrigno v. Eli Lilly & Co., 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980);
Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Ist Dep't 1981), affid, 55

N.Y.2d 571, 436 N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
164.

26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912

(1980).
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suited from in utero exposure to DES. 16 5 They identified the drug
that caused their injuries 66 and alleged negligence on the part of the
defendants for inadequately testing the drug and failing to warn
users of its potential dangers. 67 The trial court dismissed the complaint, however, for failure to identify the precise manufacturer of
the actual pill that caused their harm. 6"
On appeal, the Supreme Court of California found that it could
not apply any existing exception to the traditional causation theories
to allow the plaintiffs to recover; 6" it did not, however, leave the
victims without a remedy. Instead, the court fashioned a theory of
market share liability,170 based on the reasoning in Summers v. Tice,
that "as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the
latter should bear the cost of the injury."' 7' The Sindell court noted:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances in
science and technology create fungible goods which may harm consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer. The
response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such
products, or to
72
fashion remedies to meet these changing needs.1

In addition, according to the court, not only were the defendants in a
better position than the innocent plaintiffs to bear the financial burden that resulted from their defective products, but the imposition of
liability would encourage the defendants to manufacture safer
products.173
165. Id. at 594-95, 607 P.2d at 926, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 134.
166. Id. at 593, 607 P.2d at 925, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 133.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 598, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
170. Market share liability is a modification of the alternative liability rule established
in Summers v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948). In Summers, two hunters fired their
guns in the direction of the plaintiff, who was injured by one of the bullets. The plaintiff was
able to recover damages even though he could not identify which of the two negligent
defendants fired the shot that harmed him. Id. at 84, 199 P.2d at 2. For a discussion of the
theory of alternative liability, see infra text accompanying notes 198-240. The difference between market share and alternative liability is the way in which damages are apportioned
among the defendants. In the former, each defendant is liable for that portion of the judgment
proportionately representative of its market share. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 145. In the latter, each defendant is jointly and severally liable for the entire
judgment. Id. at 599, 607 P.2d at 928, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 136.
171. 26 Cal. 3d at 610-11, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144 (citing Summers v.
Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 199 P.2d 1 (1948)).
172. Id. at 610, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
173. Id. at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
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The market share theory requires that the plaintiffs join a "substantial percentage" of the manufacturers which may have produced
the defective product.17 4 The burden of proving causation then shifts
to the defendants, who must demonstrate that they could not have
manufactured the product that caused the plaintiff's harm. Each defendant that cannot exculpate itself is "liable for the proportion of
the judgment represented by its share of [the] market .... ",75
A number of problems in implementing the market share approach were left unanswered by Sindell. The court did not specify
what would constitute a "substantial percentage" of the market,
opining that "[w]hile 75 to 80 percent of the market is suggested as
the requirement

. .

we hold only that a substantial percentage is

required. 17 6 Additionally, the court determined that any difficulties
that the plaintiffs may encounter in specifying the relevant market
and in ascertaining the defendants' share of that market, would be
left for the trial court to consider as matters of proof.17 7 As a result,
it is unclear what a future plaintiff would have to prove with respect
to the defendants' market shares to satisfy her burden.
Alternative Liability
Other jurisdictions have allowed DES victims to recover without
adopting the market share approach enunciated in Sindell. A New
Jersey court, faced with a DES causation dilemma, held for the
plaintiffs in Ferrignov. Eli Lilly & Co.178 on the theory of alternative liability. In that case, eight women brought suit against twentytwo manufacturers and distributors of DES.179 The court relied on
Anderson v. Somberg80 for the proposition that where plaintiffs,
through no fault of their own, cannot pinpoint which of a group of
negligent defendants caused their harm, the burden shifts to the defendants to exculpate themselves. Those who cannot disprove their
liability remain jointly and severally liable."8 '
174. Id. at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 613, 607 P.2d at 937-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145-46.
178. 175 N.J. Super. 551, 420 A.2d 1305 (1980).
179. Id. at 559-60, 420 A.2d at 1309.
180. 67 N.J. 291, 338 A.2d 1, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 929 (1975). In Anderson, the
plaintiff was injured during an operation when a surgical instrument broke off in his spine. The
plaintiff sued the doctor, the hospital, and the manufacturer and distributor of the instrument.
Id. at 295, 338 A.2d at 3. Since the plaintiff was unconscious during the operation, he could
not identify who was the precise cause of his harm. Id. at 298, 338 A.2d at 5.
181. Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 566, 572, 420 A.2d at 1312, 1316.
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The question on appeal was whether the defendants could be
held jointly and severally liable even though it was uncertain that
the specific causative agent was one of the defendants before the
court. 182 The Sindell court, concerned with this precise issue, chose
to modify the alternative liability rule by requiring that the plaintiff
need only join a substantial percentage of all potential defendantmanufacturers.18 3 The Ferrignocourt, however, relying upon Anderson,1 8 held that all possible defendants need not be before the court
for the alternative liability rule to apply in an unmodified form.18 5 In
Anderson, the court could neither discern who was responsible for
the plaintiff's harm, nor guarantee that the wrongdoer was among
the defendants."8 6 The court nevertheless imposed joint and several
18 7
liability upon the defendants.
Although Ferrigno recognized that Anderson intended to limit
its holding to similar cases,188 Ferrignofound a number of parallels
between the plaintiffs in the two cases and, therefore, applied the
principles of Anderson to the DES case. 8 9 The Ferrigno court
found: (1) the defendants were members of a group where all members could be at fault; (2) the defendants owed a special responsibility to the plaintiffs as manufacturers of a potentially dangerous drug;
(3) the plaintiffs were totally innocent; (4) the harm to the plaintiffs
was not reasonably foreseeable to them and was not related to the
purpose for which their mothers ingested DES; and (5) the plaintiffs'
inability to identify the exact cause was the fault of the defendants
for marketing a fungible drug. 19 0 Furthermore, the latency period
compounded the plaintiffs' inability to identify the cause, since any
records their mothers may have kept would reasonably have been
discarded by the time their daughters' injuries surfaced.1 91 Based on
the principles of Anderson and the strong policy in New Jersey
favoring recovery by innocent plaintiffs-as opposed to the exoneration of culpable defendants-where the plaintiffs cannot identify the
182. Id. at 565, 420 A.2d at 1312.
183. See supra note 170.
184. 175 N.J. Super. at 565-70, 420 A.2d at 1312-14.
185. Id. at 569, 420 A.2d at 1314; contra Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J.
Super. 19, 427 A.2d 1121 (1981) (rejecting the alternative liability theory because all possible
defendants were not before the court).
186. Anderson, 67 N.J. at 304, 338 A.2d at 8.
187. Id.
188. Ferrigno, 175 N.J. Super. at 567, 420 A.2d at 1313.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 567-68, 420 A.2d at 1313-14.
191. Id. at 568, 420 A.2d at 1314.
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cause of their injuries,192 the court will hold for the plaintiffs.
In Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 1 93 the plaintiffs were similarly situated to the Sindell and Ferrignoplaintiffs. 9 The Michigan Court of
Appeals recognized two existing theories under which the plaintiffs
stated a cause of action without proof of the precise causative
agent19 5 and, therefore, found no need to adopt the market share
theory. Like the Ferrignocourt, the Michigan Court of Appeals recognized that the alternative liability rule that Sindell modified to
create the market share theory 9 could be applied in its original
form to Abel.197 Alternative liability is applicable where
independent acts by two or more tortfeasors [exist], all of whom
have acted wrongfully, but only one of whom has injured [the]
plaintiff. Joint and several liability is imposed, not because all are
responsible for the damage, but because it is impossible to tell
which one is responsible. Rather than deny the innocent plaintiff
his recovery because he cannot prove which of two or more wrongdoers injured him, the courts impose joint liability on all
wrongdoers.19 s
Under this theory, the plaintiffs "must establish

. . .

that each de-

fendant breached its duty of care in producing the product, that the
harm to each plaintiff was the result of ingestion of DES by her
mother, and that one or more of the named defendants manufactured the DES so ingested." 99 The burden then shifts to each of the
defendants to prove that it did not produce the pill that injured the
200
plaintiff.
Unlike the court in Sindell, the Michigan court did not believe
that an injustice would be served by holding the defendants jointly
and severally liable instead of apportioning damages according to the
defendants' proportionate share of the market.20 1 The court refused
to increase the plaintiffs' burden by requiring production of evidence
192. Id. at 569, 420 A.2d at 1314.
193. 94 Mich. App. 59, 289 N.W.2d 20 (1980).
194. The plaintiffs in Abel developed cancer because their mothers consumed DES while
pregnant with the plaintiffs. They could not identify the manufacturer of the DES ingested by
their mothers. Id. at 67, 289 N.W.2d at 22.
195. Id. at 71, 289 N.W.2d at 24.
196. See supra text accompanying note 170.
197. 94 Mich. App. at 73-76, 289 N.W.2d at 25-26.
198. Id. at 73, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
199. Id. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27 (footnote omitted).
200. Id. at 74, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
201. Id. at 76-77, 289 N.W.2d at 26-27.
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concerning the defendants' percentages of the DES market. 202 It is
possible that this refusal stemmed from the fact that in Abel, unlike
Sindell, every DES manufacturer that distributed the drug in the
state during the relevant time period was named as a defendant, so
that the chance that the causative agent would escape liability was
minimal. 20 3 As a result, the Abel court held that the plaintiffs need
not apportion damages among the defendants in order to state a
claim for recovery based on an alternative liability theory. 0 4
Concerted Action
The second theory discussed by the Abel court upon which relief
could be granted is the concerted action theory 0 5 under which
[a]ll those who, in pursuance of a common plan or design to commit a tortious act, actively take part in it, or further it by cooperation or request, or who lend aid or encouragement to the wrongdoer, or ratify and adopt his acts done for their benefit, are equally
liable with him.
Express agreement is not necessary, and all that is required is
that there be a tacit understanding .... 206
In short, if the plaintiffs can establish that the defendants engaged in
concerted activity, all of the defendants are liable even though only
one directly caused the harm.20 7 As in the alternative liability situation, the burden of proving causation shifts to the defendants to disprove their liability.2 08 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations that the defendants acted in concert by wrongfully producing
and marketing a dangerous drug without adequate testing or warnings were sufficient to state a cause of action without identifying the
precise cause of their harm.20 9
In Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.,210 a New York court modified the
concerted action theory to allow the plaintiff to recover notwithstanding her inability to identify with certainty the causative agent
of her harm. The plaintiff, seeking recovery under the concerted ac202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

Id. at 77, 289 N.W.2d at 27.
Id. at 67, 289 N.W.2d at 22.
Id. at 76, 289 N.W.2d at 26.
Id. at 71-73, 289 N.W.2d at 24.
W. PROSSER, supra note 28, § 46, at 292 (citations omitted).
94 Mich. App. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 24.
Id. at 73, 289 N.W.2d at 25.

209. Id. at 72, 289 N.W.2d at 25.
210. 79 A.D.2d 317, 436 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1st Dep't 1981), a.ffd, 55 N.Y.2d 571, 436
N.E.2d 182, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776 (1982).
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tion theory, brought suit against only one manufacturer of DES."
The defendant, Eli Lilly and Company, was a major producer of
DES at the time the plaintiff's mother ingested the drug.2 12 Since
Lilly, acting in concert with other makers of DES, wrongfully tested
and marketed the drug without warning consumers of its hazards, 213
the plaintiff alleged that Lilly should be held jointly and severally
liable for the resulting injuries. 21 '
The Bichler court agreed with the Abel decision that "the law,
especially in the products liability area, was not so rigid as to preclude an injured party, with an otherwise valid claim, from a remedy" solely because she could not discern the cause of her harm.215
For this reason, Bichler upheld the trial court's modified definition of
concerted action, under which the defendants are deemed to have
acted in concert even though they "'act[ed] independently of each
other in committing the same wrongful act, [if] their acts ha[d] the
effect of substantially encouraging or assisting the wrongful conduct
of the other, which, in this case, was the alleged failure to adequately test.' "21 The court concluded that "[ilt does not strain one's
sense of fairness to allow a limited expansion of the doctrine of concerted action to cover the type of circumstances faced in a DES case
where the traditional evidentiary requirements of tort law may be
insurmountable." 217 As a result, the plaintiff was able to recover
without proving causation.
APPLICATION OF DES CAUSATION THEORIES TO Toxic TORTS
ARISING FROM HAZARDOUS WASTE

Victims of hazardous waste face problems in proving causation
similar to those encountered by DES victims. Since their injuries are
caused by fungible goods, they confront the initial problem of identifying the cause of their injuries. Assuming that hazardous waste vic211.
212.

Id. at 319, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 627.
Id. at 319-20, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 627. Expert testimony was presented at trial that

Lilly comprised approximately 45% of the DES market in 1953, the year in which the plaintiff's mother ingested the drug. Id. at 320 n.1, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 627 n.l.
213. Although the F.D.A. approved the marketing of DES, its decision was based on

tests performed by a committee of pharmaceutical companies that was chaired by Lilly. 55
N.Y.2d 571, 576, 436 N.E.2d 182, 183-84, 450 N.Y.S.2d 776, 777-78 (1982).
214. 79 A.D.2d at 320, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 628.
215. Id. at 328, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
216. Id. at 326, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 631.
217. Id. at 329, 436 N.Y.S.2d at 632.
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tims can pinpoint the substance that caused their harm,218 they are
left with the burden of proving who allowed the particular injurycausing substance to leach out into the environment.219
The theories applied by the courts in the DES cases to shift the
burden of proving causation to the defendants may be useful to
courts faced with hazardous waste injury cases. Like DES victims,
hazardous waste victims are usually not certain of who caused their
exposure to the toxic substance at the root of their injuries.220 To
determine which theory of causation should be applied, the circumstances surrounding the injury must be examined. Where a person is
contaminated by an identifiable substance emanating from a dumpsite, he may be able to trace it to a number of defendants. The victim could then bring an action against all those that allowed the
toxic substance to escape.
If the market share theory is applied, numerous difficulties
would be encountered. First, if all those responsible for the leaching
of the harm-causing substance constitute the "market," the victim
would have to join a "substantial percentage" of those producers to
maintain a suit under the market share theory.221 Since "substantial
percentage" was inadequately explained in Sindell,222 it is not known
if the plaintiff must join a substantial percentage of the site owners,
generators, or transporters of the substance, or, alternatively, a substantial percentage of all three combined. If the defendants include
all three categories of actors, determining their proportionate market
share would be nearly impossible since they are parts of different
markets. The fact that accurate records were rarely kept by generators, transporters and site owners compounds the problems of finding
all possible defendants and ascertaining what constitutes their percentage of the market. Furthermore, a manufacturer's percentage of
dumping may not be equal to its percentage of the market. For example, one paint producer may generate more of a substance than its
competitor; or one manufacturer may recycle more of its waste than
another. It is likely that not all those responsible for discharging the
substance will be known to the victim; this, however, would not deter
218.
come. See
219.
220.
221.
145.
222.

Identifying the harm-causing substance can be the most difficult burden to oversupra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
See Soble, supra note 20, at 706.
See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at
See id.; see also supra notes 164-77 and accompanying text.
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a court from applying the market share theory since the named defendants would only be liable in proportion to their percentage of the
market. As a result of these complications, the market share theory
as set forth in Sindel 2 3 may not be the best available doctrine upon
which hazardous waste victims should seek recovery.
A concerted action theory of liability might be better suited
where the plaintiff cannot identify which defendant caused his injury. If the plaintiff alleges that the defendants acted in concert by
wrongfully discharging hazardous chemicals into a common dumpsite without adequately providing for their containment, the court,
following Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co.,224 could find that a cause of action
exists notwithstanding the lack of identification of the precise cause.
Alternatively, the modification of concerted action in Bichler v. Eli
1 5 might aid the toxic tort plaintiff to recover. The
Lilly & Co.,22
plaintiff could argue that, although the defendants acted independently, their acts of dumping the substance encouraged or assisted
the wrongful behaviors of the other defendants. The named defendants would be jointly and severally liable unless they could exonerate themselves. The possibility that every wrongdoer is not before the
court should not preclude the plaintiff from recovering damages. The
defendants could either join as third party defendants other culpable
parties not named by the plaintiff, or commence a separate action
against such parties for contribution.22
The expanded theory of concerted action, if applied to the hazardous waste situation, might allow the victims to be compensated
without proving the specific cause of their injuries. Although this
may appear inequitable to the defendants, they engaged in a hazardous activity that exposed the plaintiffs to serious risks. The equities,
therefore, weigh in the victims' favor, and the courts should adopt
this theory for such cases.
Application of the alternative liability approach may vary with
the jurisdiction, depending upon which view is followed with respect
to whether all possible defendants must be joined. Sindell stated that
alternative liability cannot be utilized unless every potential wrongdoer is before the court.227 Ferrigno, however, disagreed with
223.
224.
225.
226,
227.

Id. at 611-13, 607 P.2d at 936-38, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144-46.
See supra text accompanying notes 205-09.
See supra text accompanying notes 210-17.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A comment i (1979).
26 Cal. 3d at 603, 607 P.2d at 931, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 139.
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Sindell.228 In Ferrigno, recovery was permitted under the alternative
liability theory even though the court was not positive that the precise wrongdoer was before it. 229 Following Ferrigno, if the plaintiff
establishes that the defendants breached their duty of care in disposing of the toxicant, that the plaintiff's harm resulted from the substance, and that the defendant produced that type of toxic substance,
then the burden of proving causation shifts to the defendants. Those
defendants who cannot meet this burden will be held jointly and severally liable. A hazardous waste victim who can bring suit under an
alternative liability theory would have a chance to recover even
where it is not possible to name all potential wrongdoers.
Shifting the burden of proving causation onto the defendants
may seem unfair since the defendants may not be in a better position
than the plaintiffs to prove whose substance caused the plaintiffs'
harm. 230 The defendants, however, contributed to the identification
problem by inadequately disposing toxic substances at the same
landfill. Futhermore, while it may be true that the adoption of an
alternative liability theory for hazardous waste torts may cause
traditional concepts and basic principles of tort law to be distorted or
abandoned,231 the hazardous waste tort is not a "traditional" injury.
Rather, it is the result of our industrialized society. Therefore, our
traditional legal notions must evolve to keep up with our progressing
society.
CONCLUSION

Courts have been willing to dispense with traditional causation
tests to allow victims of asbestos and DES-related injuries to recover
without having to prove who manufactured the product that caused
the injury. The approaches these courts have utilized vary with respect to what the plaintiffs must prove in order to recover, but they
all share a common denominator-the burden of proving causation
shifts to the defendants. Although none of the tests set forth in the
asbestos or DES cases could be applied to hazardous waste cases
without some modifications, the courts could alleviate these victims'
difficulties by shifting the burden of proof to the defendants. The
plaintiffs would be required to prove (1) that they have sustained an
228.

175 N.J. Super. at 569-70, 420 A.2d at 1314.

229.

See id.

230. Namm v. Charles E. Frosst & Co., 178 N.J. Super. 19, 32, 427 A.2d 1121, 1127
(Super. Ct. 1981).

231.

See id. at 34, 427 A.2d at 1128.
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injury, (2) that the injury was caused by exposure to toxic substances, (3) that the defendants produced and disposed of such substances, and (4) that they were exposed to the substance. The burden of proof would then shift to the defendants to exonerate
themselves by either disproving the plaintiffs' offer of proof or by
establishing that the particular substance they produced could not
have injured the plaintiff.
Although the plaintiff would still have some obstacles to overcome, his burden of proof would no longer be impossible to meet.
The victim may still bear the financial burden of having tests and
studies conducted, but even this burden may be lessened in time. As
in asbestos litigation, the first few plaintiffs had to present medical
and scientific evidence regarding the effects of asbestos inhalation.
Subsequent plaintiffs, however, had this data available to them.2" 2
As more is learned about the characteristics of specific toxic substances, plaintiffs' expenditures to collect data for proof will decrease. In time, collateral estoppel may even eliminate the need for
233
such proof.
At the same time, this proposal is not unfair to the defendants
who, by producing and inadequately disposing of a fungible item,
have created the situation where innocent plaintiffs are harmed and
are unable to trace the injury-causing substance back to its source.
Furthermore, the defendants are given the chance to exculpate
themselves; lessening the victims' burden of proof, therefore, is
justified.
Traditional notions of causation were developed before the existence of toxic torts was acknowledged. Applying these tests to toxic
tort cases is analogous to placing a square peg into a round hole-it
just will not fit. The courts have realized this dilemma in the asbestos and DES cases and have modified causation theories accordingly.
The same should be done for hazardous waste cases. By shifting the
burden of proof of causation to the defendants, the courts would be
placing the burden into the hands of those responsible for creating
the problem in the first place.
Myra Paiewonsky Mulcahy

232. See Mehaffy, supra note 38, at 346.
233. See id. at 346-47; Baldwin, Asbestos Litigation and Collateral Estoppel, 17 FORUM 772, 781-83 (1982). But see Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.
1982).
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